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Abstract
Agenor and Aizenman  analyze the implications  of  verification costs, or higher volatility of productivity
inefficient financial  intermediation  for debt management  shocks may shift the economy to the wrong side of the
using a model in which  firms rely on bank credit to  debt Laffer curve, with potentially sizable output and
finance  their working capital needs  and lenders face high  welfare  losses.  The main implication of this analysis is
state verification  and enforcement  costs of loan  that debt relief may generate little welfare  gains unless it
contracts. Their analysis shows that lower  expected  is accompanied by reforms aimed at reducing financial
productivity,  higher contract enforcement  and  sector  inefficiencies.
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There is substantial agreement  among economists that inefficiencies in finan-
cial intermediation  and weaknesses  in the banking sector  have exacerbated
some of the recent economic and financial crises that have devastated so many
countries in the developing world and transition economies.I  High costs of op-
eration,  inadequate lending practices,  large volumes of nonperforming loans,
excessive  exposure  to some  sectors,  large unhedged  short-term  liabilities  in
foreign currency,  and lax supervision were all pervasive features of the finan-
cial system in many crisis-stricken  countries.
An important  source  of inefficiency  in the financial  system in many  de-
veloping  and transition  economies  relates to the high costs  associated with
the enforcement  of loan contracts,  which are due in part to the weaknesses
of the legal  infrastructure  (the inability of lenders to seize  collateral  in case
of default,  for instance)  and a high degree of asymmetry in information  be-
tween  lenders  and borrowers.  The present  paper examines  the implications
of this type of inefficiency for debt relief in an economy in which there exists
a direct link between bank credit and the supply side, through firms'  working
capital needs.  Section II describes the analytical framework,  which combines
the costly state verification  approach pioneered by Townsend  (1979)  and the
model of limited  enforceability of contracts  used in the external  debt litera-
ture, as in Eaton et al.  (1986)  and Helpman (1989a).2 In addition to the new
debt  contracted  to finance  labor  costs  during the  production  period,  firms
also  hold a large  initial  stock of debt  that they must  repay out  of current
revenue.  Section  InI  derives  a debt Laffer curve  and determines the optimal
level of debt.  Section IV analyzes the effect of a reduction in the efficiency of
the financial intermediation process (characterized by an increase in contract
ISee,  for  instance,  thediscussion  of the causes  and propagation of the Asian  crisis  in
Alba et al.  (1999)  and Radelet  and  Sachs (1998).
2See Freixas and Rochet  (1997)  for a useful description of the costly state verification
approach  to credit markets.
2enforcement  and verification  costs), an adverse expected  shock to productiv-
ity, and higher volatility of productivity shocks, on the optimal level of debt.
It is shown that all of these shocks may shift the economy to the wrong side
of the debt  Laffer curve.  Section V draws some of the policy implications of
the analysis.  In particular,  although  reducing the  face  value  of debt could
make both  lenders  and  borrowers  better off-as  emphasized  by  Krugman
(1988)  and  Sachs  (1989)  in their  analysis  of the  debt overhang  in  a more
general context-a higher degree of financial sector inefficiency may prevent
any welfare gain.
2  The Analytical FYamework
We consider an economy producing one composite tradable good, whose price
is  normalized  to unity.3 Risk-neutral  banks provide intermediation  services
to  producers,  which  demand  credit  to finance  their  working  capital needs,
consisting  only of labor costs.  Output  is subject to random,  idiosynncratic
productivity  shocks.  Following  Townsend  (1979),  the realized  productivity
shock is revealed to banks  ex post only at a cost.  In the event  of default by
any given  producer  on its  bank loans,  the  creditor  seizes  a fraction of the
realized value of output.  Seizing  involves  two types of costs:  first, the cost
involved in verifying the actual value of output, as mentioned earlier;  second,
the cost  of enforcing  repayment,  because  enforcement  of the  terms of loan
contracts requires  costly recourse to the legal system.
3The model presented in this paper is based on the framework developed by Agenor and
Aizenman  (1998,  1999).  It has been used to examine a variety of other issues, including the
real and  financial  effects  of contagious shocks  (as in Agenor,  Aizenman and  Hoffmaister
(1998)),  and the welfare costs of financial openness.  The present setting differs from these
other  papers in that we  assume that  there exists an  initial  level  of debt  which must  be
fully serviced in good states of nature.
32.1  Producers
We assume that the representative  domestic producer starts the period with
an initial level  of debt,  denoted D.  This initial debt could be interpreted in
various  ways.  The interpretation  that comes the closest to what  we have in
mind  is  an economy that  has  borrowed  significantly  on world  capital  mar-
kets during a number of periods prior to the current  one and suddenly  finds
itself "cut off"  (or rationed out) from these markets-as a result for instance
of contagion  effects,  that is,  a crisis  elsewhere  that leads foreign  lenders to
suddenly ration credit to a class of borrowers  assumed  to share similar risk
characteristics  or weaknesses  in  "fundamentals."  This  interpretation  is,  of
course,  also quite  relevant  for  countries  that  are themselves  undergoing  a
financial  crisis;  the country risk premium that such countries  face on world
financial markets may climb to prohibitive levels as a result of the uncertain-
ties created by the crisis  (such as an increase in the perceived risk of default
of domestic  borrowers  due  to a sharp  slowdown  in  economic  activity),  ef-
fectively  rationing them out of the market.  In  either case,  we  assume that
the initial level of debt must  be serviced in the current period,  and that the
inability  to borrow  on  world capital  markets  does  not  lead to an outright
default;  rather,  domestic producers  borrow from domestic  banks  to finance
their working capital  needs and, depending on the state of nature, choose or
not to repay the initial debt and the new borrowing from local intermediaries.
We assume that the interest rate on the initial debt  is predetermined  at the
beginning  of the current  period,  and for  simplicity  set it to  zero.  We also
assumed that the debt matures at the end of the current  period, an assump-
tion that  can  easily  be relaxed.  Thus,  D represents  also total  repayment
obligations on the initial debt.
The production  function is given by
Yh  =  nha(l  +  6 + CO),  (1)
where  6 >  0 is a  constant  term and h =  1,...N  refers to producer  h.  The
4idiosyncratic  shock  ch  is  assumed  to be distributed  synmnetrically  over the
interval  (-Cm,Cm).4
The representative  producer repays the initial debt  in good states  of na-
ture,  and  chooses  (partial)  default in bad states.  In  case of default  on the
initial debt,  creditors are able to confiscate  a fraction X of the realized value
of output.  Thus, default occurs  when,  ex post:
Xnh6(1 +  6 +  Eh)  < D,  ° < X < 1.  (2)
The left-hand  side of equation  (2)  is the producer's  repayment  following
a default,  whereas  the right-hand side is the contractual  repayment.  Equiv-
alently,  the producer will service the initial debt according to5
min [D; Xnh(1  +  6 +  Eh)] *  (3)
Let E* denote the threshold value of the productivity shock below which
partial default  (at the margin)  occurs on the initial level of debt, that is
D =  Xna(1 +6+E.).
Solving this equation  for E*  yields D/Xn6 - 1 - 6.  Clearly,  this value of
E*  can be less than the lower support of the distribution,  - In that case,
we  impose  E  =  em.  When  E*  = -E,  default  never  occurs  because  any
realization of the shock will always induce full repayment.  We can thus write
E[  max  6  ;  1 _  ;-Em].  (4)
Xn'h
Each  firm  finances  its labor  costs  with bank  credit.  Let  K.  denote  the
representative  bank's  bargaining  power  on the new  debt.  There  may be  a
difference between the ability to enforce the initial ("old")  debt and the "new"
4Note that, in contrast to the original model in Agenor and Aizenman  (1998),  we do not
account for aggregate shocks.  This could be done by treating 6 as a random,  economy-wide
disturbance.
5In what  follows indifference  on the borrower's part is resolved  in favor  of the lender.
5debt  contracted  at the  current  period-that  is,  K.  may  differ from  X. This
difference  may reflect the possibility that the new debt is financed mostly by
domestic banks,  whereas the initial debt  is mostly foreign debt.6
Let c* be the threshold value of the productivity shock that induces partial
default  on  the  new  debt.  We  assume  that,  in bad  states  of  nature,  the
producer would choose to default partially on the old debt, before defaulting
on the new one; that is, E- < e*.  This assumption implies that whenever the
producer defaults  on the new  debt  (that is,  when the realization  Eh  <  E*),
default  necessarily  occurs  also on the  initial debt-in which  case  creditors
seize  a fraction  XYh  of realized output, leaving a fraction  (1- X)Yh of output
from which creditors  of the new debt can seize  .
7
Given these assumptions,  debt service on the new debt  is determined  by
min [(1 +  rL)wnh; K(1 - x)n9(l +  6 + eh)],  (5)
where  rL  denotes  the  contractual  interest  rate  on the  new  debt  and  (1 +
rL)wnh contractual repayment obligations  (with w the exogenous wage rate).
This condition implies that E'  is  given by
(1 +  rL)wnh = r(1  - X)n"(l +  6 +  e),
or, rearranging terms,8
E  _  (1  +  rL)wnh  _  1-.  (6)
r.(1-  x)nh
Using  (4)  and (6),  the assumption that E*  < e  is thus equivalent to
D(l-X)> (1 +  rL)wnh.  (7)
6The qualitative features  of our analysis are basically  unchanged  if K = X.
7As shown in the Appendix,  results qualitatively similar to those derived below continue
to hold in the case where  the old debt has seniority.
8Again, if default never  occurs, we assume that e*  is set at the lower end of the support
of the distribution  (e  =-Cm)
6Condition  (7)  is  likely to be  met  for  a large  enough  level of the initial
debt D, or for a relatively  large K  relative to X.
Assuming that  condition  (7)  holds, and that the price  of output  is con-
stant and normalized to unity, expected profits of the representative producer
are given by
Ih = j  [n(+6+eh)-D]f  (eh)dh+(l  -X)  J  n(1+6+Eh)f  (Eh)dEh (8)
-(1+  rL)wnh  1  f(Eh)dEh - (-  X)  J  nh(1  + 6 + Eh)f(gh)ddEh
The  first  two terms  in this equation  represent  expected revenue,  net  of
repayment  on  old  debt,  whereas  the last  two  terms  account  for  expected
repayment  on the new  debt.  The first  term on the right-hand  side  of this
equation measures revenue in  "good" states of nature (in which case the bor-
rower repays the old debt D in full), whereas the second measures net revenue
after confiscation in "bad"  states (in which case the producer's repayment  is
only a fraction X of realized output).  The third term measures repayment  on
the new debt in good states  of nature,  whereas  the last term measures  net
revenue after confiscation  associated with defaulting on both the old and the
new debt.
2.2  The Contractual Lending Rate
The  representative  bank  has  information  about  the  choice  of labor  input
by producer  h,  and determines the interest  rate such that the expected  net
repayment on the new debt is equal the cost of credit.  Each bank is assumed
to deal with a large number  of independent  producers,  allowing the bank to
diversify the idiosyncratic risk,  6h*
In the absence of default, the representative bank's net profit,  11 b,  is given
by the difference between contractual repayment  and the gross cost of funds:
rb  =  (1  +  rL)wnh  - (1 +  rc)wnh,  (9)
7where rc denotes the cost of funds for the bank, assumed  exogenous.
In case  of default,  the  representative  bank's  net  profit  is  equal  to the
representative  producer's  repayment  (that  is,  the  value  of realized  output
seized  by  the bank)  minus  the  (gross)  cost of funds  and  minus the cost  of
state verification and contract  enforcement,  denoted C,  which is assumed to
be independent  from the cost  (and  amount)  of funds  borrowed  by producer
h:9
nb =  (l  -X)n(1  +  6 + Eh)-(1 +  rC)wnh-C-  (10)
The first term in this expression  accounts for the fact that the producer
first repays  a fraction X on the initial debt, before servicing the new debt.
Assuming risk neutrality and competitive banks, the rent dissipation con-
dition implies that the interest  rate on the new debt,  rL, is set according to,
using (9)  and  (10):
(1 +  rc)wnh =  (1  +  rL)wnh 1j  f (eh)deh  (11)
+  |  [9n6(1 +  6 +  Eh)  - C]f(eh)deh,
_ em
where 9 =  K(l - X).  This expression can be rewritten in the form
rL  - rc  wn  n/  n1 3(e  - eh)f(eh)dCh+ cJ  f(Ch)ddhj  (12)
Equation (12)  shows that the spread between the contractual lending rate
and the bank'  funding cost  is the sum of two terms:  the first measures the
expected revenue lost due to (partial) default in bad states of nature,  and the
second the expected state  verification and contract enforcement  costs when
default occurs.
9The  analysis can  easily be extended to consider  the case where  C is  proportional to
repayment;  see  Agenor,  Aizenman,  and  Hoffmaister  (1998).  It would  be more  involved,
however,  if some costs  were  asssumed to accrue  after the  information  about the idiosyn-
cratic  shock is  obtained.  In  such circumstances,  banks  would  refrain  from  forcing  debt
repayment  when realized productivity  is below a threshold  of enforcement.  For simplicity
of exposition,  and  because  they  would  not  modify  the  key  results  discussed  below,  we
abstract  from  these considerations.  We  also  ignore  all other  real costs  associated  with
financial  intermediation.
82.3  Expected  Profits and Optimal Employment
Applying  (11)  to  (8),  we can rewrite  the  expression  for the representative
producer's  expected  profits as
nh  =  X  [n(1l +  E  + Eh)  - D]f(eh)deh +  (1-  X)  ; nh(1 +  6 +  gh)f(eh)dgh
(13)
-(1 +  rc)wnh - Cj  f(6h)dch,
c(m
where  e*,  the threshold  level of productivity  associated  with partial default
on the new debt, is determined  by rewriting (6),  using (11),  as
On  (l + 6 +  ) =  (1 +  rc)wnh +  J  [:n[n(e* - Eh) + C]f (eh)deh,
h~~~~~~~~~  em
that is
e*=  (3p1  +  rC)  nl  {j  [O([  -deh)  + Cf(eh)de}- 1 - 6.  (14)
The optimal level of employment  is determined by maximizing  expected
profits,  equation  (13),  subject to (14).Io  The corresponding  first-order  con-
dition is obtained by setting 11hnh = 0, that is
/3nph~  {,  (1  + (+eh)f(eh)deh  +  (1  - X)  (1  + 6+eh)f(eh)deh}  (15)
-(1  + rc)w -Cf (E*)  -=  o,
dnh
where, from  (14):
de*  0,Bnh 3 1(1 +  6 +  e*)  - w(1 +  rc) -0,3n'- 1fm(e*  -h)f  (eh)deh
dnh  On'h6 f.m f (e6)de - Cf  (e*)
10Following  our earlier paper  (Agenor and Aizenman  (1998))  we assume in what follows
that each individual producer takes the contractual lending rate as given when determining
the optimal level of employment.
9Substituting  (14)  into the right-hand side of dE*/dnh we infer that
de*  - (!)(1-A)(1 +  rc)wnh-  fC  f:.m f (Eh)dEh
dnh  nh  OnIh f,  f(Eh)dE - Cf(e*)
which implies  that,  as  long  as C is not  too  large,  dE*/dnh > 0.1l  We  can
state the following proposition.
Proposition  1  The optimal level of employment, fih,  can be urritten as
nh =  fih(X, rc, C, D),  (16)
and it depends negatively on the four arguments in (16).
To establish  for instance that dfih/dC < 0, note first that
sg [dnh]  rsg  hnhC
1dCj  [_IhnhnhJ
Applying  the second-order  condition for maximization  yields
sg [fIhnhc]  = -f  (E*)  (-)  < 0,
which implies  in turn that dfih/dC < o.12
So far we have not made any specific assumption about the distribution
function of the idiosyncratic  productivity shock,  Eh.  But suppose  now that
Eh  follows a uniform distribution,  so that f(Eh)  = 1/2Em,  and Pr(eh > x)  =
(em - x)/2Em.  Then, in addition to the results summarized in proposition  1,
the following result can also be established.
Proposition  2  An increase in Em,  which can then be interpreted as a (mean-
preserving) increase in volatility, reduces optimal employment.
IUThe  condition  that C is  not  too  large  is needed  to  ensure  that we  operate  on  the
upwards-slopping  portion of the supply of credit facing the economy,  leading to the results
stated.  Operating  on the backward  bending portion of the supply of credit can be shown
to be sub-optimal,  and to affect  the comparative static results.
12A more detailed appendix providing exact expressions  for all the derivatives  shown in
Proposition 1 is available  upon request.
10To show that  indeed  dhh/dCm  < 0  if Ch  follows  a uniform  distribution,
note first that
S9  [-]  =  S9 [IIhnhlE]
FRom  (15),  IIhnh = 0 now yields
,3n  {  m Yh  dEh +  (1-  X) LS2  f (Eh)&h]'
-(1+  rc)w-  d*  =°'
FRom (6), de*/dnh =  (1-,3)(l+rL)wn-7j/K(1-X),  which does not depend
on em.  Thus, the above expression,  implies that
1 hnnhem  =  <1rc)w  '0
Cm
3  The Debt Laffer  Curve
Assuming, to simplify notations, a zero subjective discount rate, the expected
value of the initial debt from the point  of view of the lenders is given by
f  D  if  =  =
I  {D fiem  f  (Eh)dE +  f!:m ghf (Eh)dEh}  if E* >
where
9h =  Xnh(l + 6 +  h)  -C-
This expression assumes, for simplicity, that verification  and enforcement
costs associated  with servicing the new and the initial debt are the same.  It
shows that when default  never occurs  (E*  =  -em), the expected value of the
debt  is  simply its  face  value.  By contrast,  when the possibility  of default
exists  (E* > -Em), the expected  value of the debt depends also on contract
enforcement  and state verification  costs,  as discussed  earlier.  In addition,
11when  there is  the possibility  of default,  it  can  also be established  from the
above expressions  that a higher  initial debt  has an ambiguous  effect  on the
expected value of the debt:
dV  f (h)d  (*)  (17)
+  {|  /Xn-  1(1  +  6 +  Eh)f(Eh)dE +  Cf(E  )  - }  dD  < 
Equation  (17)  defines a debt Laffer  curve, which is depicted in the upper
panel of Figure 1 as LL.  It is linear (as depicted by the segment OB) up to
a threshold level of debt D, given by
D = Xn"(1 +  6  em),
which  corresponds  to equation  (4)  with  Et  =  -m.  Equivalently,  expected
repayment  increases one for one with the initial value  of debt  (dV/dD = 1);
the segment  OB is thus along a 45-degree  line.
For levels of initial debt  (marginally)  above D, equation  (17)  boils  down
to
dV  -1-Cf  (E.)f 1 _(/3D\(dnh)l  (18)
dD  xnn  (  nh  dD'(1
Assuming that enforcement  costs C are small enough, that  is, that C is
such that
1 >  E (1  _n)  d)  dnhl
then,  for relatively small  levels of initial  debt above D,  the curve LL is up-
ward sloping.  Note also that a larger level of initial debt increases  E,  thereby
reducing the first term on the right-hand side of equation (17); this term ap-
proaches  zero for a large enough level of initial debt.  Similarly,  higher initial
levels of debt raise  the absolute  value  of the second,  negative  term in  the
above expression,  because dnh/dD < 0:  a higher level of initial debt  lowers
employment  and thus  output,  making default  more probable  and lowering
12the value  of claims that creditors  can seize  in case  of default.  Hence,  for  a
large enough level of initial debt, the right-hand side of (17) is negative.  The
"optimal"  level  of initial  debt, denoted  by D*,  corresponds  to the value  of
the stock of debt for which  dV/dD = 0 and is obtained at point  A.  Beyond
point  B,  the probability  of repayment  falls  below  unity;  and  beyond point
A, levels  of debt are so high that additional  amounts of debt  actually lower
expected repayments.  Consequently,  the association between the contractual
value of the initial debt and its expected value has the typical inverted  U (or
concave)  shape that characterizes  the debt Laffer curve (see Krugman (1988,
1989)  and Sachs  (1989)).  The difference  between the  (present)  value  of the
country's  contractual  debt  obligations  and  the expected  resource  transfers
that  must  be  made  to service  that  debt,  V,  measures  the debt  overhang.
Thus,  as long  as E* > -Em-that  is,  as  long as  the possibility  of default  is
allowed  for  in some states  of nature-and  as  long as  D > D*,  the country
will suffer  from a debt overhang.  Creditors  would then benefit  from a lower
contractual  value  of the initial stock of debt,  because  it would  increase  the
expected value of their debt claims.
The lower panel of Figure 1 depicts the relation between optimal employ-
ment and the initial level of debt,  as given by  (16).  The first segment  of the
curve,  HH',  is flat,  because optimal  employment,  in the  absence  of default
risk  (E*  =  Em),  and given the  assumption that  c* <  E*,  does not  depend
on initial debt.  The  reason  is that the  cost  of credit  depends  on expected
verification and enforcement  costs, which in turn depend on the probability
of default;  for D less D that probability  is zero and thus the level of initial
debt has no effect on the cost of credit,  as can be inferred from (12).  Beyond
point H' the curve is convex to the origin.  At the optimal level of initial debt
D*,  employment is given  by iih  (point E).
The following proposition  can be easily  established:
Proposition 3  Less efficient financial  intermediation, as measured by higher
state verification and contract enforcement costs (a rise in C), or lower ex-
13pected productivity (a lower value of 6) reduce the optimal value of the initial
debt.  In both cases the debt Laffer curve shifts downward and to  the left.
To establish that  dD*/dC < 0,  for  instance,  note  that  by the  implicit
function theorem,  we have
dD*/dC = -VDC/VDD.
Applying the second-order  condition for maximization yields
sg [dD1] =  sg [VDC]  =  -X  _ (/nh  ndD  J dC  ~~Xnha  nh  dD'
A diagrammatic  illustration of this proposition is also provided  in Figure
1.  Except  for  the linear  segment  OB, the  shape  of the debt  Laffer  curve
depends on both the cost of financial intermediation  and the expected  pro-
ductivity  shock.13 An increase in enforcement  costs  (a rise in C)  shifts the
BL segment  of the  curve  in the upper  panel leftward  and inward,  to BL'.
The optimal value of the initial debt  is now determined  at point  A",  which
is  lower  than the initial  value  at  A.  In the  lower  panel,  the  relation  be-
tween optimal employment  and initial debt becomes also steeper beyond the
threshold  value D; the new optimal  value  of employment  is  determined  at
point E", and is lower than fih,  as established in Proposition  1.
The  figure  also  illustrates  an important  implication  of the  analysis:  if,
at the initial  level of C, D*  is the optimal  value  of initial debt (that  is,  the
value for which dV/dD = 0), at the new value of C the initial D*  will be too
high because  it  will be  located on  the wrong  side of the debt  Laffer  curve
(point A').  Employment,  at E', will be also lower than the new optimal value
E".  Thus,  less  efficient  financial  intermediation  does not  only increase  the
likelihood that  the economy may  be stuck  in an inefficient  equilibrium  (on
the wrong portion  of the  debt  Laffer curve),  but  it is  also  associated  with
(potentially large)  employment  and output  losses in the short term.
13The reason  is that,  from  (4),  i*  is equal to -em  along OB, and depends  on both the
optimal level of employment  beyond point B.
14Under  the assumption that the  idiosyncratic  shock  Eh  is  uniformly  dis-
tributed,  the following proposition can also be established.
Proposition 4  An increase in em,  which is equivalent to a (mean-preserving)
increase in volatility, has qualitatively similar effects on the shape of the debt
Laffer curve as those associated with an increase in intermediation costs or
lower exrpected output.
Finally, it can readily  be established that an increase in the volatility of
aggregate productivity shocks-which can be captured in the present setting
by  treating  3 as  a uniformly  distributed  random  disturbance-leads  to  a
proposition  similar to the one above,  as can be inferred  from the results  in
Agenor and Aizenman  (1998).
4  Policy Implications
Despite the stylized nature of our analysis, the foregoing results are useful to
understand some aspects of the crisis  in East Asia and the policy responses
that it could have led to.  To many  observers,  one of the surprises that sur-
faced in the immediate aftermath of the crisis was that the outstanding stock
of private external debt, particularly in Korea and Thailand, was much larger
than previously assumed (see Aizenman and Marion  (1999)).  This is consis-
tent with the assumption in our model of an "initial"  level of debt that must
be serviced out of current resources.  Furthermore,  simple calculations  show
that there was a significant increase in output  volatility in the aftermath of
the crisis.  The  coefficient  of variation of the industrial production index in-
creased between the period January 1991-June 1997 and July 1997-December
1998  (that is,  in the immediate aftermath  of the crisis)  from 3.6  percent  to
6.8 percent  in Korea, from 4.3 percent  to 5.2 percent in Malaysia,  and from
6.3  percent  to 6.6 percent  in Thailand.  This  is  captured  in our  framework
by examining  the impact  of higher  volatility  on the shape  of the debt Laf-
fer  curve.  Finally,  the  crisis revealed  also the state  of the private  banking
15system, and the relatively high cost of bankruptcy procedures.  Although  we
do  not  have  firm  evidence  that  verification  and  enforcement  costs  of loan
contracts  increased in the region in the aftermath of the crisis, it is plausible
indeed that such  costs rose significantly.  Asymmetric  information problems
tend to be  exacerbated  in  a more  volatile  economic  environment,  thereby
forcing banks to expend more resources to assess and verify claims made by
borrowers  regarding  their situation.  All  these developments  may have  led
some  of the crisis-stricken  countries-such  as Korea,  where domestic  firms
were  highly indebted-to move on the wrong  side of their debt Laffer curve.
As  shown earlier,  lower productivity,  higher volatility  of output, and higher
financial  intermediation  and  enforcement  costs shift  the debt  Laffer  curve
leftward  and inward,  whereas  a larger  outstanding  stock of debt  shifts the
economy's position to the right-possibly to an extent that is  large enough
to create a debt overhang problem.
What does the model imply, therefore, in terms of policy responses?  One
approach is to argue that debtors and creditors  should act collectively to re-
duce the face  value of debt,  because  it is beneficial to both parties.  A large
debt  overhang  entails  indeed  well-known  economic  costs,  induced  by both
illiquidity and disincentive effects  (see Krugman  (1989)  and Sachs  (1989)).14
In the context of our  analysis, the short-termf  employment  and output costs
associated with a debt overhang  can  also be substantial.  In practice,  how-
ever, there are also well-known difficulties associated with a coordinated debt
reduction  among  a (large)  group  of creditors,  such moral  hazard  problems
that  such operations  entail:  each  creditor  has  an incentive  to refrain  from
offering  debt relief on its own  claims and wait for  others to do so,  thereby
raising  the expected value of its own claims." 5 This type of free-rider  prob
14In particular,  a  high level of debt creates  uncertainty  about the country's capacity  to
service  its debt  and discourages  private (domestic  and foreign)  investment.  Furthermore,
high debt service may be perceived  by investors as a form  of tax on the future income of
the country, thus dissuading new investment.
15See Sachs (1989).  As shown by Helpman (1989b),  if lenders interact noncooperatively,
each  of  them  taken  individually  may  in  fact  be willing  to  provide  some  debt  relief-
16lems may make it impossible  in practice,  to consider debt relief as a viable
policy response.
To the extent that asymmetric  information problems tend to be  exacer-
bated by crises  (as noted earlier),  and that as a result financial intermediaries
in post-crisis countries may experience an increase in the cost of verifying and
enforcing loan contracts,  our model suggests an alternative response to a debt
overhang-namely,  financial sector reform.  The ability of lenders to have re-
course  to an  efficient  legal system to seize collateral  in  case of default,  for
instance,  is  an  important  determinant  of contractual  relations  (in  a crisis
context or not) and has a significant impact on the determination  of lending
rates-and thus eventually  the levels of output and employment.  In terms
of our Figure  1, the reduction in C could lead, for instance to a shift  in the
Laffer curve from an initial segment BL' to BL.  Moreover,  as can be inferred
from our analysis,  it is possible that debt relief may not be sufficient to shift
the economy  to the  "right"  side of the debt  Laffer if at the same  time  en-
forcement  or verification costs increase.  In terms of Figure 1, this would be
the case,  for instance,  if debt reduction,  starting  from a level  of debt  equal
or greater than D*,  moves  the economy from a point  to the right of A to a
point to the left, such as H; if there is at the same time a rise in C (because
of an increase  in verification  costs,  as  discussed  earlier)  the  economy  may
settle to  a point such as H' on the new BL' segment  and to the left of  A',
implying  that the economy  would still be on the  "wrong"  side of the Laffer
curve.  In such  conditions,  debt relief is not  sufficient  and would need  to be
accompanied  by deeper reforms  in the financial intermediation  process.
5  Summary and Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper has been to examine the implications of inefficient
financial  intermediation  (taking the form  of high  costs of contract  enforce-
although not as much as they would  if they were to act collectively.
17ment and state verification)  for an economy  in which  firms are faced with a
high level  of initial  debt and contract  new borrowing  from  domestic  banks
to finance labor costs.  After presenting the producer's  decision problem,  we
analyzed the determination of the contractual lending rate on the new debt,
which was shown to be a mark-up over the cost of borrowing, with the size of
the mark-up related  positively to the probability  of default.  We also showed
that optimal employment depends negatively  on the cost of state verification
and contract enforcement,  as well as the initial stock of debt obligations held
by firms.  We then derived a debt Laffer curve with regard to the initial debt,
and determined the  "optimal"  level of debt consistent with the absence  of a
debt overhang.  We analyzed the effect of an increase in contract enforcement
and verification  costs,  as well  as an expected  negative  shock to output  and
an  increase in the volatility  of productivity  shocks,  on the  optimal  level  of
debt.  We  showed  that,  as  a result  of either  one  of these  shocks,  the econ-
omy  may move  on  the  "wrong"  side  of the  debt  Laffer  curve.  Moreover,
our analysis showed that this shift  may be accompanied  by  (possibly  large)
employment  and output  losses  in the short term.  Thus,  in countries  where
financial  intermediation  is highly  inefficient  (in the sense  that enforcement
costs of loan contracts  are relatively high),  or in a country experiencing  large
adverse  output  shocks  and  higher volatility,  the likelihood of an inefficient
equilibrium  is also high.
We also argued that because,  of well-known moral hazard problems, debt
relief as a policy  response to an economy  that  is moved  to the  wrong  side
of the Laffer  curve  (as  a result,  for  instance,  of an increase  in volatility  or
higher state verification costs) may not feasible or desirable.  On the contrary,
what  our  analysis  suggests,  is  that financial  sector reform  (in the sense  of
measures  aimed  at reducing  the  cost  of financial  intermediation,  including
contract enforcement  costs) may be essential-indeed,  not only to reduce the
adverse  incentive  effects  of a debt  overhang,  but more  generally  to increase
economic efficiency..
18Appendix
This  appendix considers  the case in which the initial debt,  D, is  senior
to the new debt.  New lending is done by foreign banks.  For simplicity, these
banks  have  identical  enforcement  costs  to the senior  banks.  This  cost  is
paid by the relevant  bank in a lump-sum fashion each time that the country
defaults  on  its obligations  to that bank.  In states of partial  default,  new
(junior)  banks  get only the  residual  of the debt  service  after  repaying the
initial debt to the senior banks.  In this setup,  the country will default first
on the junior debt at a low enough value  of the productive  shock,  e*.  The
country will default  on both types of debt at a lower value of the productivity
shock,  e'  < c*.
The repayment  rule for producer h is given by
min [(1 +  rL)wnh +  D;  Xyh] ,  (Al)
where  Yh  is given in (1),  that is, nh(l +  6 +  eh).
The threshold value e*  is now determined  by the equality
xn6(l +  6 + E*)  = (1 + rL)wnh + D,
so that  E.a#  [(1 +  rL)wn  +  D  1 6 ]
Xnh
is now given by
xn(l  +  6  +e)  =  D.
Expected profits of producer h are now given by
Ih  =  [yh - D - (1  +  rL)Wnh] f  (Eh) dEh  (A2)
-x  Y|hf(Eh)dCh-
19The net junior debt service from the point of view of the junior banks is
given by
max{XYh  - D;  O} - C  if eh < e*,
(A3)
(1  +  rL)wnh  if  Ch >  e*.
Expected  repayment  to the representative  bank,  which  determines  the
contractual  interest rate on the new debt, rL,  is thus determined  by
(1 +  rC)wnh =  (1 +  rL)wnh |  f(eh)deh  (A4)
+  (XYh  - D)f (eh)deh  - C I  f  (6h)dCh,
Using  (A2) and  (A4) yields
h=  J  (Yhy-D)f(eh)deh-X  J  Yhf (eh)deh
-(1 + rc)wnh +  |  (Xyh  - D)f (6h)dh  -C  f  f  (eh)deh,
which can be rewritten as
rh  =  n Yhf (eh)deh  - D fX  f(eh)deh  (A5)
-(1 +  rc)wnh-  X  Yhf(eh)deh  -Cf  f(eh)d6h-
Finally,  the  expected  market  value  of the  initial  debt  is  given  by,  for
e  >  -
V = DJ  f(eh)dEh + J  (XYh-C)f(eh)deh.  (A6)
From equations  (A5)  and (A6),  it can be readily established that all the
results summarized in propositions  1 and 2 given in the text continue to hold.
In addition,  assuming that eh is distributed uniformly,  propositions  3 and 4
can be shown to hold as well.
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